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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
In the June Commentary we stressed that 
the Scottish economy was threatened with 
stagnation as the rate of recovery slows. This 
threat is even more real today than it was 
then. Growth has continued to weaken in the 
global economy and is weaker in the UK and 
Scottish economies too. The UK economy 
has effectively stagnated over the last year, 
growing by only 0.5%. In Scotland growth 
was flat between April and June and 
business surveys suggest continuing 
weakness in the third quarter. The UK has 
recovered more strongly than Scotland, by 
nearly 3% compared to around 1% to 2% in 
Scotland, even though the recovery is weak 
overall. There is little comfort in the latest 
GDP data for both Scotland and the UK. This 
is underlined by the latest US real GDP 
figures which reveal an annualised growth 
rate of 2.5% for the third quarter of this year. 
Growth in the US is still weak by the 
standards of previous recoveries and 
insufficient to make much of a dent in the 
high levels of unemployment. Yet, it is 
notable that with the latest quarter's results, 
GDP in the US economy moved back above 
its pre-recession peak output, whereas the 
UK and Scotland are still - in the second 
quarter - 5% and 4%, respectively, below 
their pre-recession GDP. It will not go 
unnoticed that, unlike the UK, the US has 
only recently adopted an austerity 
programme, which has yet to kick in. We 
therefore welcome the Bank of England's 
decision to undertake a further expansion of 
the money stock through quantitative easing 
and note that there is still scope for some 
fiscal easing without damaging our fiscal 
credibility in the long-term. 
 
Added to this are the consequences of the 
problems in the Eurozone which are affecting 
business confidence and if there is a 
disorderly Greek default will have damaging 
consequences for Scottish exports, 
investment and household spending as bank 
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lending contracts further. The problems 
become much greater if there is a prospect 
of an Italian default, which, if it occurred, 
would probably throw the world economy into 
a recession as big, if not bigger than the 
Great Recession that started in 2008. On a 
gloomy note we consider that there is not a 
high probability that the Eurozone problems 
will be quickly resolved. Even if some 
headway is made in creating a sustainable 
financing mechanism for those member 
countries that are finding it difficult to fund 
their sovereign bonds at reasonable rates, 
such as the ECB becoming a full lender of 
last resort like any other central bank, there 
is still the issue of adjustment to deal with if 
the problems are not to recur. Peripheral 
member countries need to improve (lower) 
their prices and costs relative to Germany on 
a sustained basis. Being members of a 
currency union precludes own currency 
devaluation so the periphery must adjust by 
a relative internal deflation of wages and 
prices of significant proportions. We are not 
sanguine that this can be achieved without a 
higher level of inflation in the EZ core - 
Germany especially - being tolerated and 
that looks unlikely. The future of the present 
Eurozone looks bleak. 
 
Against this background we are forecasting 
GDP growth of 0.4% this year, and 0.9% in 
2012 compared to our June forecast of 0.8% 
and 1.5%, respectively. Our research on 
previous forecast errors – see the paper by 
Grant Allan – suggests the lower and upper 
bounds for growth in 2011 are expected to 
be 0.1% and 0.7% and for 2012, 0.4% and 
1.4%. Forecasts for the UK have also been 
reduced by independent forecasters, 
reflecting the weakening in the UK and global 
economies. So, overall, we are projecting 
weaker growth than previously and 
continuing weaker recovery than the UK.  
 
In the labour market we note the strong 
contribution of part-time employment to the 
recent recovery in jobs. On our central 
forecast, net jobs grow by 0.2% in 2011, 
0.4% in 2012 and 0.7% in 2013. By end 2013 
total employee jobs are forecast to be 
2,324,000 around 80,000 fewer than at the 
end of 2008 but up by 60,000 from the end of 
2009, and up by 30,000 from the end of 
2010. By sector, the largest absolute growth 
in job numbers is forecast for the production 
sectors in 2011(2,400 against 2,250), but in 
services in 2012 (4,950 against 3,400 in 
production) and 2013 (9,350 against 6,100). 
Few jobs are created in construction or in 
agriculture over the forecast horizon. 
Unemployment, on the preferred ILO 
measure is forecast to rise to 8.3%, or 
219,800 by the end of this year, rising further 
to 234,800 or 8.9% by the end of 2012. After 
that, the numbers unemployed will fall only 
slightly to 231,550 by the end 2013 but the 
rate stays the same at 8.9%. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The latest quarterly growth data from the Scottish 
government for the second quarter 2011 reveal that GDP 
grew by 0.1%, the same as in the UK. Hence, growth was 
largely flat between April and June in both Scotland and the 
UK and weaker than in the first quarter where growth is now 
estimated to have been 0.2% - see Figure1.  
 
Over the year to the second quarter GDP growth was 
weaker in Scotland with net output growing by 1.1% 
compared to 1.5% in the UK. 
 
There was a boost to Scottish growth from a strong 
performance of Electricity, Gas Supply, with growth of just 
over 15% compared to a fall of -1.7% in the sector in the 
UK. But the sector only contributes about 2% to overall 
GVA. Both the major Services sector (73% of the economy) 
and Construction (8% of the economy) were weaker in 
Scotland compared to their UK counterparts in the quarter 
see Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Services grew by 0.1% in Scotland but by 0.2% in the UK, 
while Construction contracted by -2.3% in Scotland but grew 
by 1.1% in the UK. Over the year, Service sector growth 
was weaker in Scotland at 0.1% compared to growth of 1% 
in UK Services. In contrast, Construction performance was 
stronger in Scotland with growth of 11.8% compared to 
7.3% in the UK. 
  
In the latest quarter, manufacturing grew by 0.2% in both 
Scotland and the UK, a bit better than the economy overall 
but still relatively weak growth - see Figure 4. Over the year, 
manufacturing output has grown by around 2% in Scotland 
but with growth of nearly 5%, the sector has grown more 
strongly in the UK.  
 
When the latest data are looked at over the period since the 
start of the recession the challenge facing the Scottish 
Vol.35 No.2, pp.4-19. 
 
Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2011q2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q2 
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Figure 3: Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q4 
 
economy is clear. Scottish GDP is still more than 4% below 
where it was just before the recession started - see Figure 
5. The UK economy is nearly 5% below from where it 
started. However, the depth of the recession was greater 
and sharper in the UK, with GDP falling by just over 7%, 
whereas in Scotland the drop was a little under 6%. But the 
UK has come back more strongly than Scotland, by nearly 
3% compared to around 1% to 2% in Scotland, even though 
the recovery is weak overall. There is little comfort in the 
latest GDP data for both Scotland and the UK. This is 
underlined by the latest US real GDP figures which reveal 
an annualised growth rate of 2.5% for the third quarter of 
this year. Growth in the US is still weak by the standards of 
previous recoveries and insufficient to make much of a dent 
in the high levels of unemployment. Yet, it is notable that 
with the latest quarter's results, GDP in the US economy 
moved back above its pre-recession peak output, whereas 
the UK and Scotland are still - in the second quarter - 5% 
and 4%, respectively, below their pre-recession GDP. It will 
not go unnoticed that, unlike the UK, the US has only 
recently adopted an austerity programme, which has yet to 
kick in. 
 
While in the second quarter Scottish GDP was 4% below its 
pre-recession peak, GDP is further below where it would 
have been if the recession had not occurred and the 
economy continued to grow at trend. Figure 6 provides the 
results of applying trend growth of 0.5% per quarter to the 
pre-recession peak. This suggests that Scottish GDP was 
10.4% below where it would have been with no recession. 
However, we cannot be sure that the recession may not 
have destroyed capacity, so, for example, there may be 
financial service activities that will never return. Assuming 
that lost capacity is 2% of GDP - i.e. one third of the 
percentage drop in GDP due to the recession -  we then 
apply the 0.5% quarterly trend rate, which leads to an 
'output gap' of 8.5% by 2011Q2. A worst case scenario 
where the trend rate of growth is lower at 0.4% per quarter 
as well as a once and for all permanent loss of output leads 
to an output gap estimate of 7.3% by 2011q2.  
 
What this analysis suggests is that the economy is much 
worse off than suggested by the current growth rate and by 
the extent to which GDP is below the pre-recession peak. 
Moreover, if the trend projection is anywhere near accurate 
it also suggests that the amount of spare capacity is large 
and there is much room for growth and therefore a demand 
stimulus without inflationary fears. 
 
We can get a deeper understanding of the strength of the 
recovery in Scotland, absolutely and compared to the UK, 
by looking at the real GDP performance of the principal 
sectors since the beginning of the recession. 
 
Figure 7 charts the recession and recovery in the Service 
sector in Scotland and the UK. Services account for 73% of 
total Scottish value added or GDP. The figure shows that 
UK services had a steeper recession than Scottish services 
with GVA falling by -5.35%, while GVA in Scottish services 
fell by -4.89% during the recession. However, recovery from 
recession has been much stronger in UK services. By the 
second quarter of this year, UK services were -2.88% below 
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Figure 4: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q2 
 
 
 
the pre-recession peak, whereas Scottish services were -
4.42% below. What this suggests, and what the figure 
shows, is that there has been hardly any recovery in 
Scottish services at all. After the drop in services GVA in the 
recession it has stagnated thereafter for nearly two years 
and can be described as "bumping along the bottom". 
  
The explanation for this stagnation is because services 
depend much more on local domestic demand than sectors 
such as manufacturing. It is now well known that household 
consumption in the UK was badly affected during and after 
the recession. This was the consequence of the legacy of 
high levels of household borrowing for mortgages and 
personal credit that was a contributory factor in the credit 
crunch and subsequent collapse of demand. Moreover, as is 
revealed in the discussion of the household spending data 
in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section in this 
Commentary below, income growth in Scotland is slightly 
weaker than in the UK as a whole which along with 
consequences of the debt overhang is likely to account for 
the overall weakness in Scottish household spending and 
hence service sector growth. 
 
The financial services and business services sectors taken 
together account for 26% of overall Scottish GDP and 29% 
in the UK. Figure 8 charts the recession and recovery in this 
combined sector in Scotland and the UK. What is evident 
from the chart is that the recession in this sector was much 
greater in Scotland than in the UK, and this might in part 
reflect the greater incidence in Scotland of the banking 
problems that precipitated the credit crunch and recession. 
It is also clear from the chart that there has been hardly any 
recovery from recession in the sector. UK business and 
financial services have contracted further and GVA in the 
sector stands more than 7% below the pre-recession peak. 
In Scotland, while there has been some recovery in the 
sector during the last two years it is marginal with GVA now 
standing less than 11% below the pre-recession peak. 
 
The UK government hopes that rapid growth of exports and 
investment will underpin the recovery from the Great 
Recession. Exports and investment must grow appreciably 
to offset weakness in household spending, labouring under 
a debt overhang and squeezed disposable income, and 
weakness in government spending, due to fiscal 
consolidation. Exports are mainly of manufactured goods. 
So, while manufacturing directly contributes only about 12% 
to GDP in Scotland and 10% in the UK as a whole it is 
expected to play a crucial role in the recovery. Stronger 
manufacturing export growth will contribute to GDP growth 
directly but also indirectly through an increased demand for 
service sector inputs and from the spending of higher 
earned incomes. We noted above the comparatively weak 
recent growth in manufacturing in both Scotland and the UK 
and the weaker growth in Scotland over the year. Figure 9 
charts the recession and recovery in the manufacturing 
sector in Scotland and the UK. The very large falls in 
manufacturing output in both Scotland and the UK are
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Figure 5: GVA and Jobs in Recession and Recovery: Scotland and UK 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Scottish 'Output Gap' under different assumptions  
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Figure 7: The Service Sector: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
  
 
 
Figure 8: Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK  
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Figure 9: Manufacturing: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
 
 
 
clearly evident. Moreover, the drop in output was much 
greater in the UK, at over -13%, than in Scotland, at a little 
above -10%. However, it is also evident that UK 
manufacturing has recovered more rapidly than Scottish 
manufacturing. By the second quarter of this year UK 
manufacturing GVA was just under 6% below its pre-
recession peak, while UK manufacturing was just under 7% 
below its pre-recession peak. So, by the second quarter UK 
manufacturing had recovered nearly 50% (48.5%) of the 
GVA lost in the recession, while Scottish manufacturing had 
recovered just over 40% (42.3%). The recovery is weak in 
both UK and Scottish manufacturing but the challenge 
confronting Scottish manufacturing is clearly evident, given 
the weakness of Scottish household demand and the lack of 
recovery in the Scottish service sector. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 charts the recession and recovery in the 
construction sector in Scotland and the UK.  The drop in 
output in the recession was sizable and at just above -18% 
broadly the same in Scotland and the UK. The figure reveals 
that construction recovered more quickly from recession in 
Scotland than in the UK, and we noted above that 
construction performance has been stronger in Scotland 
over the past year. This will offer comfort to the Scottish 
government that its decision to front-load capital investment 
last year may have had a positive outcome on construction 
output. However, we are not convinced that the timing of the 
upsurge fits with the outlay of additional government capital 
investment. An alternative, albeit anecdotal, view is that the 
boost to Scottish construction in 2010 came from projects in 
the pipeline that were held back or the start-date postponed 
because of the recession. Whatever, the explanation for the 
upsurge, the downturn again in the sector over the last three 
quarters must be a cause for concern. 
 
The labour market 
The latest labour market data for Scotland show falling 
employment in the latest quarter (-24,000) and rising 
employment over the year (+20,000) - see Overview of the 
Labour Market  section below. Unemployment rose by 7,000 
in the quarter but has fallen by 17,000 over the year. The 
Scottish unemployment rate now stands higher at 7.9% but 
remains below the UK unemployment rate of 8.1%. In 
addition, the rate of employment of the population aged 
between 16 and 64 fell to 71.2% but is still above the UK 
employment rate of 70.4%. 
 
These data have, quite reasonably, been interpreted as 
indicating that the Scottish labour market continues to be 
robust both absolutely and relative to the UK, despite the 
latest evidence of weakening. However, we must be careful 
about the conclusions that we draw from these data. 
 
First, total UK employment is currently about 1.5% below 
its pre-recession peak while total Scottish employment is 
more than 3% below its pre-recession peak - see Figure 11. 
 
Secondly, strong growth in jobs in Scotland of 70,000 
between the first quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of this 
year masks the fact that Scotland endured a large shake-ou
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Figure 10: Construction: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
  
 
 
Figure 11: Employment in UK and Scotland relative to Apr-June 2007 Scottish peak and Apr-June 2008 UK 
peak  
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of nearly 50,000 jobs between the 2009q4 and 2010q1. This 
was probably an over-reaction by Scottish employers so 
there might have been an element of catch up last year as 
employers sought to establish a proper balance between 
jobs and output. Alternatively, there is a parallel with the 
rapid surge in GVA in construction which rose in the first 
three quarters of 2010 with the rise in jobs coming plausibly 
one quarter later in the second, third and fourth quarters. 
So, if the job surge was due to the rapid increase in 
construction activity, this leaves open the question whether 
it was the Scottish government's decision to front-load 
capital investment that caused it.  As we noted above it is 
not clear to us that the timing fits and there are other 
candidate explanations for the upsurge in construction 
activity. What cannot be denied, however, is the evidence 
that the Scottish labour market shed -4.77% of its jobs in the 
recession while the UK  shed only -2.41% and job levels are 
still more than 3% below the pre-recession peak in Scotland 
but only 1.5% below in the UK. 
 
Thirdly, one must also look at the movement within the 
overall jobs total, particularly what is happening to jobs in 
the both the private and public sectors. The public sector 
jobs figures released in September show that public sector 
employment in Scotland fell by 25,200 in the year to the 
second quarter of 2011, while there were 57,700 more jobs 
in the private sector over the period. The performance of the 
private sector job creation is clearly going to be of crucial 
importance to the future jobs prospects of the Scottish 
labour market as fiscal consolidation bites.  
 
Finally, we need to bring in a fourth factor when considering 
the state of the Scottish labour market. This is that one 
should not judge the state of the labour market by job 
creation alone but by the creation of jobs in relation to 
available labour reserves. Working population has been 
rising in Scotland by a little more than 100,000 since the 
start of the recession. When that is taken into account we 
see - Figure 12 - that the total employment-working 
population ratio is still more than -5.5% below its pre-
recession peak while the ratio fell by -6.35% from peak to 
the trough of the recession. 
 
These figures do not indicate a tight labour market but one 
that is still suffering from  a severe lack of demand, nearly 
four years after the start of the recession . Moreover, job 
creation in Scotland appears to be more biased towards 
part-time working than in the UK, so relatively less labour 
services may be being demanded than is apparent from the 
simple job numbers. The numbers of full time workers in 
Scotland has declined by 120,000 since the pre-recession 
peak, whilst part time employment, in contrast, fell by only 
7,000 during the recession then recovered quickly to be 
40,000 higher between April 2010 - March 2011 than the 
pre-recession peak. When expressed in terms of full time 
equivalents the recent stronger Scottish employment growth 
is much more muted. 
 
Another labour market issue that should not be forgotten is 
the degree of inequality between participants and areas that 
appear to have worsened in the recession and the limited 
recovery. The 18-24 year old age group has been badly hit 
with its employment rate dropping from 68.1% between April 
2007 and March 2008, to 61.7% between April 2010 and 
March 2011. During the past year the deterioration in job 
losses amongst young people - 18-24 - has continued. In 
addition, the employment rate for men has fallen by more 
than that for women except in the 50 - 64 age group.  North 
Ayrshire and Glasgow continue to suffer high unemployment 
rates of 12.1% and 11.2%, respectively, compared to the 
national average of 7.9%, almost twice the rates that existed 
before the recession. Inactivity rates were also high in the 
two areas, as well as Eilean Siar, at 29.8%, 29.4% and 
31.4%, respectively, compared to the national average of 
22.9% 
 
Overall, it appears that  the growth of private sector output 
remains weak and insufficient to offset the effects of fiscal 
consolidation to produce falling or stable unemployment. 
The growth of part-time employment  appears to be masking 
a decline in full-time employment. Levels of inequality in the 
labour market are worsening particularly to the 
disadvantage of young workers and areas such as North 
Ayrshire, Glasgow and Eilean Siar. The latest data are 
consistent with our expectation that we should expect 
unemployment in Scotland to begin to rise again. 
 
Persistent macro-economic policy myths 
There are several myths that have gained currency with key 
policymakers, and opinion formers across the world that are 
seriously limiting appropriate policy responses to the 
aftermath of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis. 
 
General  
 
Myth 1:  Reducing government budget deficits and debt 
 levels - "fiscal consolidation" - will enhance growth 
 - "expansionary austerity"  
 
This is the obverse of the view that high levels of 
government borrowing and rising debt will lead to higher 
interest rates, yields on long-term (10 year) bonds, thereby 
slowing growth and risking higher inflation. While there may 
be some truth in this view if the economy is close to full-
employment it is definitely not the case when there is a large 
degree of spare capacity and unemployment is high. In this 
situation any consequences for the interest rate and its 
effect on demand will be more than outweighed by the 
countervailing change in aggregate demand due to the net 
change in government spending. So, cutting government 
spending may lower interest rates to some degree as well 
as input costs, including wages, for the private sector. Some 
boost to demand may come from that. But it will be more 
than outweighed by the loss of output and jobs caused by 
the cut back in government spending.  
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Figure 12: Employment in Scotland to Working Population relative to Apr-Jun 2007 peak 
 
 
 
Recent research by IMF staff looked at the impact of fiscal 
consolidation using data over the past 30 years, covering 
173 episodes in 17 advanced countries. Their conclusion is 
stark, " ..fiscal consolidations typically have the short-run 
effect of reducing incomes and raising unemployment. A 
fiscal consolidation of 1 per cent of GDP reduces inflation-
adjusted incomes by about 0.6% and raises the 
unemployment rate by almost 0.5 percentage points .. within 
two years, with some recovery thereafter. Spending by 
households and firms also declines, with little evidence of a 
handover from public to private sector demand. In 
economists' jargon fiscal consolidations are contractionary, 
not expansionary."
1
 Added to this, the authors find that long-
term unemployment increases and inequality rises with the 
burden mainly falling on wage earners rather than on 
recipients of profits and rents.
2
 
 
When it is remembered that the fiscal consolidation 
occurring in Britain is planned to take 6% out of GDP by 
2015-16 then on the above estimates real GDP is likely to 
be nearly 4% lower and unemployment 3% points higher as 
a result. Moreover, while in more normal times there might 
be some favourable effect on interest rates and private 
sector activity due to fiscal consolidation that is much less 
likely today following the Great Recession because interest 
rates are almost zero. This is a situation where there is an 
excess of desired savings and individuals/institutions have 
more than enough liquidity - a situation economists describe 
as a 'liquidity trap'. The effect is that interest rates will tend  
not to rise following a fiscal stimulus, nor fall following fiscal 
consolidation. Krugman (2011)
3 
shows that  10 year US 
Treasury bond yields actually fell over the period since 
2008, when there was a $4 trillion rise in US federal debt 
held by the public. 
 
Myth 2:  Printing money - "quantitative easing" - will 
 necessarily lead to inflation, even hyper-
 inflation   
 
The view that expanding the monetary base - via the 
purchase by the central bank of long-term bonds - will 
promote inflation depends on a complicated transmission 
mechanism that sees a lowering of interest rates, rising 
asset prices, increased spending, rising nominal GDP with 
rising prices, promotion of inflationary expectations and an 
inflationary spiral. However, interest rates are effectively 
zero - the 'zero bound' - so that banks, financial institutions 
and corporates may be quite happy to swap one store of 
value, a bond, for another store of value, money, with no 
further consequences. It is only if the trade gives the banks 
etc. desired liquidity that there is likely to be a carry-though 
to spending and a rise in nominal GDP. Furthermore, if 
there is much spare capacity in the economy and high 
unemployment, as at present, the likelihood is a rise in 
output and not prices. So on this basis under present 
conditions expansion of the monetary base is unlikely to 
promote inflation and given almost zero interest rates and a 
'liquidity trap' may not have much impact on demand - 
nominal GDP - at all. The current evidence that growth in 
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the monetary base has not led to growth in the broader 
definition of money (M4) which includes bank deposits, the 
continuing weakness of bank lending, low levels of 'core' 
inflation - wage growth is no more than 2% - as opposed to 
'headline' inflation and weak inflation expectations would 
appear to offer support for these points.
4
 
 
Eurozone 
 
Myth 3:  Large government budget deficits and  
 high levels of sovereign debt are the result of 
 government profligacy. 
 
The Eurozone (EZ) crisis is the most significant for the world 
economy since the events of late 2008 following the 
collapse of Lehmans. Yet, much media discussion and the 
pronouncements of the ECB, and key member governments 
such as Germany
5
 and France seek to source the crisis to 
the irresponsible 'local' behaviour of the governments of 
peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy. The implication is that if such governments 
begin to behave responsibly then after some adjustment the 
problems of the EZ will be resolved. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The problems of the EZ are largely 
'systemic' although the behaviour of some governments and 
private sector agents in individual countries such as Greece 
has not helped. Kash Mansor
6
 demonstrates that the 
explanation is more 'systemic' than 'local'. The creation of 
the EZ made it more attractive for investors in the rest of 
Europe to buy assets in the peripheral countries, where 
there were, on the face of it, significant investment 
opportunities. Governments in the periphery were able to 
borrow at near German rates because the financial markets 
believed, and were implicitly led to believe by the ECB and 
Germany and France, that peripheral country sovereign 
bonds had the backing of the EZ authorities. This led to 
significant flows of capital from the centre to the periphery 
and a crisis was precipitated when these flows suddenly 
stopped. 
 
The evidence for this is in the data presented by Mansor 
and in his words " The factor that crisis countries have in 
common is that, without exception, they ran the largest 
current account deficits in the EZ during the period 2000-
2007. The relationship between budget deficits and crisis is 
much weaker; some of the crisis countries had significant 
average surpluses (e.g. Spain and Ireland) during the years 
leading up to the crisis, while some of the EZ countries with 
large fiscal deficits (e.g. France and Germany) did not 
experience crisis. This is one piece of evidence that a surge 
in capital flows, not budget deficits, may have been what 
laid the groundwork for the crisis." Moreover, " ... the capital 
flow bonanzas in evidence ... were directly the result of the 
adoption of the euro by the peripheral EZ countries, which 
made it easier for capital in the core EZ countries to find 
investment opportunities in the periphery."
7
 
 
Several of the periphery countries such as Greece, Portugal 
and Spain have real efficiency and competitiveness 
problems, which makes it difficult for them in a monetary 
union, led by Germany, that has high levels of productivity 
growth. One saving grace might have been if these 
investment flows had facilitated an economic adjustment in 
the periphery sufficient to raise their productivity and 
competitiveness towards German levels. The evidence 
shows that the capital flows were associated with 
investment spending  rising in the periphery countries (with 
the exception of Portugal), and for consumption to fall. So, 
no evidence of local irresponsibility there. However, the 
capital flows in addition tended to fuel rising domestic prices 
in the periphery, hence a rising real exchange rate and 
deteriorating competitiveness, which improved little relative 
to Germany. 
 
Myth 4:  "fiscal and structural reforms" in the periphery 
 will solve the current problems of the 
 Eurozone . 
 
This seems to be the view of the ECB and the core EZ 
states, Germany and France. There are two issues that 
need to be addressed: financing and adjustment of the 
peripheral states with high and unsustainable debt levels. 
The model of financing adopted by the EZ is to use the 
EFSF with leveraged funding up to 1,000bn Euros, bank 
recapitalisation and where necessary, as in the Greek case, 
debt relief: a 50% write-down of Greek debt is on offer. The 
financing package relies to a large extent on private sector 
support: voluntary debt write-downs and voluntary bank 
recapitalisation, as well as hoped for financial support for 
the EFSF from China. In addition, the peripheral economies 
are expected to make significant structural adjustments: 
budget deficit reductions and steps taken to improve the 
competitiveness of their economies through, effectively, 
internal devaluation of wages, prices and cost reductions 
relative to the EZ core. 
 
There is little likelihood that these measures will solve the 
problems of the EZ. On financing, while the scale of support 
on offer might be sufficient to support Greece it is unlikely to 
be sufficient to support Italy because the scale of its 
indebtedness and its refunding requirements is so much 
greater. The only real solution to the financing problem is for 
the ECB to take on the true role of a central bank, which is 
not simply aiming for price stability but also acting as lender 
of last resort. If ECB acted as a lender of last resort it would 
start to buy individual sovereign bonds where there was a 
market shortfall. This is what the Bank of England would do 
in the UK or the Fed in the US. However, to fulfil this 
function would require the ECB to print Euros and hence 
increase the money stock. Given German sensitivities over 
inflation this is unlikely to happen and so the EZ crisis will 
continue until eventual breakup and reconstitution in some 
new form with perhaps a core Germany, France, Holland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg monetary union. 
 
Added to this is the question of adjustment. The overriding 
goal of the ECB and the core countries of the EZ is that the 
burden of adjustment must be borne by the current account 
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deficit countries in the periphery. But to secure adjustment 
in the absence of individual national currencies requires 
internal devaluation: price and wage reductions relative to 
the core. This is almost impossible to secure. Countries 
such as Ireland and Latvia which might be described as the 
poster boys of internal devaluation have hardly achieved 
any real internal reduction in wages and prices. We can say 
with some certainty that Germany and the ECB need to 
accept that current account surplus countries within the EZ 
are part of the problem. They must adjust too. They can 
adjust by allowing an expansion of domestic demand 
sufficient to promote a rise in domestic inflation to 3% to 4%. 
If that happens then it will be easier for the periphery to 
adjust through a much less stringent internal devaluation. If 
that does not occur there is little hope for the survival of the 
EZ as presently constituted. 
 
UK 
 
Myth 5:  Fiscal austerity is necessary to secure 
 business and financial market confidence.  
 
A special case of Myth 1.  Here we have the belief, 
frequently articulated by the UK government,  that fiscal 
consolidation will not only free up private sector resources 
for growth but is necessary to encourage financial markets 
to accept lower interest rates - yields - on government 
bonds and hence borrowing. Lower bond rates make the 
debt easier to fund, make it more sustainable, and require 
less diversion of public spending to fund it. The coalition 
government's view is that current low yields on UK 10 year 
bonds represent a vote of confidence in the UK 
government's fiscal austerity policy. Hence, austerity was 
necessary even when the UK economy was relatively 
depressed. The alternative view is that stabilisation and 
reduction of debt levels through reduced structural budget 
deficits is necessary within a medium term fiscal framework. 
On this view, a fiscal stimulus may be required in the short-
term to boost aggregate demand and protect tax revenues, 
with deficit reduction and reduced debt levels occurring in 
the medium term when the economy has more normal 
levels of aggregate demand. 
 
What the evidence seems to show is that low UK 
government 10 year bond yields are more a reflection of 
expectations by the financial markets of low growth, and 
hence a flight from 'risk assets' such as equities into less 
risky assets such as UK, US and German sovereign debt. 
Neither the US nor Germany has put in place austerity 
measures on the scale of the UK government. 
 
Myth 6: Britain's current weak current growth 
performance is a consequence of the 
Eurozone crisis 
There is a sense from some of the comments of UK 
government ministers to recent UK growth figures that the 
crisis in the Eurozone is being blamed for the current 
weakness of UK growth. While it is certainly the case that 
the crisis is affecting confidence and may be leading to a 
reluctance to invest by some companies in the UK, the 
reason for a loss of confidence is that the crisis portends the 
risk of sovereign default, contagion to other sovereigns, 
bank runs, bank failures, and a drop in aggregate demand 
and GDP. If and when any of those events occur then the 
harmful impact on the global economy, including the UK, will 
be dramatic. But in the meantime the explanation for weaker 
UK growth largely rests at home: the continuing 
consequence of the debt overhang for household spending, 
low expectations of growth by firms leading to weak 
investment, insufficient pickup in net exports and the impact 
of the sizable fiscal consolidation. It is revealing that the US 
while experiencing a weak recovery from the Great 
Recession nevertheless returned to its pre-recession peak 
level of GDP in the third quarter of this year. The UK, in 
contrast, is still 4% below its pre-recession peak although 
the UK's unemployment rate is slightly lower at 8.1% 
compared to 9.1% in the US. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
The weakness of the global economy continued into the 
third quarter although there were some brighter spots. First, 
the US economy grew by 0.6%, or an annual rate of 2.5%. 
This is still weak growth for a recovery phase but it was 
better than expected and, as noted above, it took US real 
GDP back to its pre-recession peak. But the US economy is 
still not creating enough jobs to reduce its unemployment 
rate which is still at the high level of 9.1%. Secondly, the UK 
reported real GDP growth of 0.5% in the third quarter which 
was above the anticipated 0.3%. However, the special 
factors that temporarily reduced growth: the Royal wedding; 
two bank holidays; and the effects on supply of the 
Japanese Tsunami, have now unwound, so that the ONS 
recommends that the two quarters should be taken together. 
On that basis growth averaged 0.3% in the two quarters, 
with real GDP largely stagnant over the past year rising by 
only 0.5% over the year to the third quarter. 
 
While the recent poor performance of UK GDP is due to 
weak domestic demand, the problems of the Eurozone (EZ) 
are likely to diminish future growth prospects even further. 
The 25 basis point cut in the ECB funds rate is very 
welcome but this reverses what was clearly an ECB  policy 
error in raising the rate by the same amount in July. For 
most advanced economies on most key indicators, such as 
GDP, jobs and wage incomes, the recovery is worse than 
the average from previous recessions - see the FRED  - 
Federal Reserve of St Louis - database.
8
 This supports the 
Reinhart Rogoff (2010) research findings that economies 
subject to a recession precipitated by financial and banking 
crises in particular experience a very weak recovery.
9
 
 
The latest forecasts from the London-based NIESR - The 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
suggest continuing weakness in UK GDP growth for the 
next eighteen months at least, with growth of 0.9% this year 
and 0.8% in 2012. They noted in their October GDP 
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estimate release that this recovery will be the weakest of 
any since the end of the First World War and that includes 
the 1930s Depression. Against that background, we 
welcome the decision by the Monetary Policy 
Committee(MPC) of the Bank of England in October to 
begin a further programme of "Quantitative Easing" by 
increasing the purchase of, largely, government bonds with 
long-term maturities (more than 3 years) by £75 billion to 
£275 billion. But with the difficulties confronting monetary 
policy when interest rates are close to zero in getting carry 
through to nominal GDP, we still believe there is scope for 
more fiscal easing. This view is held by NIESR too, who in 
publishing their latest forecasts argue "  .. it remains our 
view that in the short-term fiscal policy is too tight and a 
modest loosening would improve prospects for output and 
employment with little or no negative effect on fiscal 
credibility."
10
 
 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2011-2013  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2011 2012 2013 
Central forecast 0.4 0.9 1.6 
June forecast 
 
UK median independent last 3 months (October) 
 
Mean Absolute Error % points 
0.8 
 
1.0 
 
+/- 0.296 
 
1.5 
 
1.5 
 
+/- 0.492 
1.9 
 
na 
 
na 
 
 
 
Scotland cannot help being touched by weak household 
spending in the rest of the UK as well as the deteriorating 
conditions in the EZ. For example, more than half of 
Scotland's exports outside the UK are to EU economies 
mostly within the EZ.  
 
Domestically, wage income growth has been weaker in 
Scotland than the UK, but UK income growth slowed in 
2011 possibly moving the two more into line - see 
discussion of SNAP data in Scottish Economy Forecasts 
section below. Household spending fell by more in the UK 
during the recession, 6.5% compared to a fall of 4.5% in 
Scotland - a fall of 5% in the UK over the same period. 
Perhaps as a result, the UK savings rate stayed above the 
Scottish savings rate until the end of last year when the 
Scottish rate moved above the UK rate. We do not have 
data for much of 2011, nor do we know whether the Scottish 
data may be revised in the light of revisions to the UK data 
published on October 25th, so we don't know for certain 
whether there was an absolute and/or relative weakening in 
Scottish household expenditure. What is beyond doubt is 
that household spending in both Scotland and UK remains 
very weak, along with investment and exports.  
 
Some light on the performance of the Scottish economy in 
the third quarter can be shed from survey data - see Review 
of Business Surveys section below. The third quarter 
surveys of output, jobs and retail spending broadly suggest 
a slowdown in activity  with the expectation of a further 
slowdown and perhaps a complete halt to the recovery in 
the winter months. The Scottish Engineering Review is 
something of an exception, retaining a positive outlook but 
even here firms responding to the survey reported rising 
uncertainty. Overall, we consider that the demand for 
Scottish goods and services both currently and in the near 
term has weakened since we published the last 
Commentary in June. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we adopt a new presentational 
procedure. Since 2008 we have presented a high and low 
forecast as well as the central forecast. This was done in 
recognition of the high degree of uncertainty confronting the 
economy at the time and since. However, following recent 
work in the Institute reviewing the accuracy of FAI forecasts 
- see Grant Allan's paper later in this Commentary - we are 
now able to use the estimated forecast errors to establish 
the likely range that the true first estimate of the growth of 
Scottish GVA will lie between. 
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2011 to 2013. The forecasts are presented 
in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
section of this Commentary below. 
 
Table 1 shows that we have revised downwards our 
forecast for all years. The lower forecasts reflect a 
weakening in household spending and export growth 
particularly compared with the position in June. The OBR 
forecasts for the UK are now out of date since they were 
produced in March and almost certainly will be revised 
downwards this month. Our forecasts are therefore 
compared with the median of latest independent  forecasts 
for the UK in 2011, 2012 that are published by the UK 
Treasury. We are now forecasting growth of 0.4% in 2011, 
and 0.9% in 2012 compared to our June forecast of 0.8% 
and 1.5%, respectively. Given our previous forecast errors 
the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2011 are expected 
to be 0.1% and 0.7% and for 2012, 0.4% and 1.4%. 
Forecasts for the UK have also been reduced by 
independent forecasters, reflecting the weakening in the UK 
and global economies. So, overall, we are projecting weaker 
growth than previously and continuing weaker recovery than 
the UK. 
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Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2011-2013 
 
 2011 2012  2013 
Upper 11,150     18,850 41,100 
June forecast 36,317 41,882  60,675 
Central  4,900       8,750      16,200 
June forecast  20,600 18,548  39,849 
Lower -1,550          -1,350     -9,250 
June forecast 9,621 2,661  21,431 
 
 
   
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 
 
 2011 2012  2013 
ILO unemployment 
    Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+)  8.3% 8.9%  8.9% 
Numbers  219,800 234,200  231,550 
Claimant count       
    Rate (CC/CC+total job)  5.4% 6.0%  5.9% 
Numbers  149,500 166,300  164,400 
 
 
 
 
We expect that production and manufacturing output will 
continue to be the main sectoral drivers of growth, with 
Production forecast to grow by 1.2% this year compared to 
service sector and construction growth of 0.2% which are 
largely flat-lining. In 2012, production continues to be the 
main sectoral driver of growth with growth of 2.2%. Stronger 
growth is projected for services and construction of 0.6% 
apiece but the two sectors remain comparatively weak. It is 
not until 2013 that we see much pick-up in growth. GDP is 
forecast to rise by 1.6%, still about 0.4% points below 
historic trend, while production growth rises to 3.7%, service 
sector growth moves up to 1.1% and the growth of 
construction GVA reaches 1%. 
 
Employment forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 
3 years 2011 to 2013 in terms of a central and upper and 
lower forecasts. 
 
Table 2 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
are much reduced from the forecasts presented in the June 
Commentary. The lower forecasts reflect data revisions, 
revised productivity estimates and the impact of a 
weakening economy. On the central forecast, net jobs grow 
by 0.2% in 2011, 0.4% in 2012 and 0.7% in 2013. By end 
2013 total employee jobs are forecast to be 2,324,000 
around 80,000 fewer than at the end of 2008 but up by 
60,000 from the end of 2009, and up by 30,000 from the end 
of 2010. By sector, the largest absolute growth in job 
numbers is forecast for the production sectors, in 
2011(2,400 against 2,250) but in services in 2012 (4,950 
against 3,400 in production) and 2013 (9,350 against 
6,100). Few jobs are created in construction or in agriculture 
over the forecast horizon. 
Unemployment forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3 below. 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed 
who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. Unemployment 
is projected to rise further compared to our June forecast as 
GVA growth and job creation weakens. The recovery of 
Scottish GDP is expected to continue to be weaker and at a 
rate below that which is required - from the estimated Okun 
relationship - to stabilise unemployment. Hence 
unemployment is projected to rise even with positive output 
growth. Unemployment in Scotland this year is forecast to 
rise to 8.3%, or 219,800 by the end of this year, rising 
further to 234,200 or 8.9% by the end of 2012. After that, the 
numbers unemployed will fall only slightly to 231,550 by the 
end 2013 but the rate stays the same at 8.9%. However, as 
previous quarters have demonstrated there is considerable 
uncertainty around the unemployment forecast due to the 
extent to which output change maps into job change, 
changes in working population and independent variations  
in activity rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
4 November 2011 
 
Vol.35 No.2, pp.4-19. 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes 
1
L. Ball, D. Leigh, and P. Loungani (2011) "Painful Medicine" ,  
Finance and Development, September, page 22; and J. Guajardo, 
D. Leigh and A. Pescatori (2011) "Expansionary Austerity: New 
International Evidence" IMF Working Paper 11/158. 
 
2
L. Ball, D. Leigh, and P. Loungani (2011) op cit pp. 22-23. 
 
3
P. Krugman (2011) "Mr Keynes and the Moderns" Paper presented 
at the Cambridge conference commemorating the 75th anniversary 
of the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money, June. 
 
4
See A. Posen (2011) "How to do more" Speech given by Adam 
Posen, External Member of the MPC, Bank of England, September. 
 
5
Wolfgang Schauble, Germany's Finance Minister writing in the FT 
on 5 September 2011 " Whatever role the markets have played in 
catalysing the sovereign debt crisis, it is an undisputable fact that 
excessive state spending has led to unsustainable levels of debt 
and deficits that now threaten our economic welfare." cited by Kash 
Mansor (2011) " What Really Caused the Eurozone Crisis? (Part 1)" 
Street Light Blog, 22 September, http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/ 
 
6
Kash Mansor (2011) op cit 
 
7
 Kash Mansor (2011) op cit 
 
8
http://research.stlouisfed.org/economy/ 
 
9
Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2010), This Time is Different, 
Princeton 
 
10
http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pdf/031111_83237.pdf 
 
 
Vol.35 No.2, pp.4-19. 
 
 
Vol.35 No.2, pp.4-19. 
 
 
